Author: Warren I. Cohen is Dustinguished Universoty Professor of History at University of Maryland Baltimore County(UMBC) and Senior Scholar at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.
(excerpt) Koguryo proved thougher. Perceiving Koguryo to be the greater threat, Gaozong chose to join forces with Silla. Paekje, fearful of Silla, sided with Koguryo. The Japanese, initially on the sidelines, grew fearful of the Tang-Silla alliance. Paekje had been Japan's historic friend on the Korean peninsula, but apprehension about the extension of Tang power across the Korean peninsula, ultimately to threaten Japan directly, probably drove japan's decision to intervene. Japanese leaders may not yet have conceived of the smile of Korea as a dagger pointed at the heart of Japan, but they had the general idea. In 660 a large Japanese fleet attempted to interdict Tang naval operations against Paekje - with disastrous results, most notably the loss of 400 vessels and the destruction of Paekje, Nontheless, Koguryo staved off Tang and Silla force until 668 when a combined Chinese and Silla force invaded from the south. Northern Korea and western Korea fell under Chinese control. But if Gaozong assumed Silla would be next, giving him the control of the peninsula so feared by the Japanese, he was to be greatly mistaken. Although Silla accepted Chinese overlordship, it proved to be a very independent and ungrateful vassal, pushing the Chinese out of Paekje and parts of Koguryo. Unification of the Korean peninsula was a goal Silla shared with China, but to Silla's leaders it would be a Korea under their control.
Of course, the Chinese had little time to enjoy their triumph over Koguryo or to indulge themselves in bringing Silla to heel. In the West, the Tibetian empire rapidly became a major threat not only to imperial China's colonies and protectorates, but also to what the court perceived to be part of Chinese heartland. In 662, a Chinese army, exhausted by its succesful campaigns against the Western Turks, was confronted by a combined Tibetian and Turkic force in the vicinity of Kashgar. It chose not to fight and apparently traded military equipment for assurance of safe passage. Over the next several years, while the Chinese were fighting in Korea, the Tibetians were eliminating Xianbi and Western Turk's rivals on China's western frontiers. By 670, they were ready to take on the Chinese and launched a massive attack on China's dependencies in the Tarim Basin region (in modern Xinjiang). Gaozong and his advisors had little choice but to abandon plans for the conquest of Korea and respond to the threat from the Tibet. (p.73)
As Gaozong's consort maneuvered to retain her power, ultimately becoming, as the Wu Empress, China's first female ruler, China's woes were compounded by rebellion among the Eastern Turks. They were suppressed before the emperor's death, but again only at great cost to victor as well as to vanquished. For all Gaozong's accomplishments, he left China in crisis, its defenses and its treasury strained, its people weary of battle - and its empire held together only by the extraordinary machinations of a very shrewd woman.
Wu Zhao, who had been one of Taizong's concubines, captured the affection and admiration of Gaozong (Taizong's son) and became his empress. She had considerable influence on Gaozong's policies and appears to have had a particular interest in foreign policy. She contributed greatly to the cosmopolitan nature of Tang society by her receptiveness to foreign merchants and the trade they stimulated. She was also brobably the architect of the successful Tang policy in the 660s and retained Silla's respect throughout the years of her reign, 690-705. (p. 74)
To the northeast, Chinese military operations might be considered defensive. Xuanzong[/li][li] doubtless would have liked control of all of Mongolia, Manchuria, and Korea. Had there been fewer problems in central Asia, and especially with the Tibetian empire, he might have behaved more aggressively toward the Khitan, the new state of Parhae, or Silla. He appears, however, to have found the wealth of central Asia and the trade routes that ran across it more attractive, and to have been willing to settle for what was already China's domain in the east. Silla, for its part, was reasonably content to avoid confrontation with China; the Khitan and Parhae were not.
[/li][li] the sixth emperor of the Tang dynasty in China, reigning from 712 to 756.
Parhae was a new state established in Manchuria by a former Koguryo general early in the eighth century. Adopting a Tang-style centralized administration, Parhae quicly gained control of much of what had been Koguryo's territory and generated wealth and power sufficient enough to cause unease both in China and Silla. China established diplomatic relations with it and looked to Silla for support should Parhae become as aggressive as Koguryo had been. In 732 Chinese fears were realized when Parhae launched a successful naval raid against a city on the Shandong peninsula. Chinese retaliation had little impact and Silla, presumably no less apprehensive about China's intentions, provided little support. At mid-centry Parhae was thriving, greatly influenced by Chinese culture, participating in the tributary system, but very much an independent power of whose peaceful intentions China could not be assured. The Tang had little choice but to treat Parhae with respect and to maintain defensive forces wherever Parhae might strike. (pp. 78-79)
Silla's "Golden Age" corresponded roughly to that of the Tang, ending not long after the An Lushan rebellion (755-763) undermined Tang rule in China. Relations between Silla and China were always uneasy, despite Silla's wholewsale borrowing of Chinese institutions and culture, despite Silla's annual tribute embassies to Chang'an. China, even as it faced more serious threats from Tibet, maintained defences against a possible naval attack by Silla. The leaders of Silla constantly anticipated an attack by Tang forces. Had the two countries been able to eliminate these anxieties, they might have been able to use their resources more efficiently. Unfortunately, they never were able to devise the necessary confidence-building measures, although in 735 China did recognize Silla's control of all territory south of Taedong River. Of course, the Tang did not relinquish its claim to the Korean peninsula between the Taedong[**] and Yalu[***] rivers.
[**] Taedong river flows through Pyongyang, the capital of North Korea. [***] The Yalu River (Chinese) or the Amnok River (Korean), is a river on the border between China and North Korea. The Chinese name comes from a Manchu word meaning "the boundary between two fields". The Korean name is the Korean pronunciation of the same Chinese characters. (p. 97)
Last Edit: Jun 12, 2007 22:18:23 GMT -5 by Candylover
Chin or Jin is also old name of Korean tribal state.
There r 2 Jin appeared in Korean history.
First Jin was original Jin meaning "Original". Second Jin was Chin empire (founded by Mohe tribes or malgal jok) means Golden. Either way, both Jins have very strong influence of Korean tribal heritage.
However, Chinese regards them as their own history and ppl.